A strong user authentication protocol for GSM by Aydemir Ö. & Selçuk, A.A.
A Strong User Authentication Protocol for GSM 
Özer Aydemir 
TÜB TAK UEKAE LTAREN Research Center 
06100 Ankara TURKEY  
ozer.aydemir@iltaren.tubitak.gov.tr
Ali Aydın Selçuk 
Dept. of Computer Engineering, Bilkent University 
06800 Bilkent Ankara TURKEY 
selcuk@cs.bilkent.edu.tr
Abstract 
Traditionally, the authentication protocols for 
cellular phone networks have been designed for device 
authentication rather than user authentication, which 
brings certain limitations and restrictions on the 
functionality of the system. In this paper we propose a 
user authentication protocol for the Global Standards 
for Mobile (GSM) which permits the use of weak 
secrets (e.g. passwords or PINs) for authentication, 
providing new flexibilities for the GSM users.  
Keywords: Wireless network security, GSM, user 
authentication, strong password protocols.  
1. Introduction 
Mobile telephone networks are becoming more 
popular everyday, and the Global System for Mobile 
(GSM) is the most commonly used standard for mobile 
communications with more than one billion users 
worldwide [5]. GSM defines the services, 
functional/subsystem interfaces, and protocol 
architecture for digital mobile radio networks. Identity 
of a GSM subscriber is established by the subscriber 
identity module (SIM). For authentication, GSM relies 
on a symmetric encryption key embedded in the SIM 
card [3, 6, 11]. 
One of the reasons for preferring device 
authentication in GSM rather than user authentication 
is humans’ inability to remember strong secrets; they 
tend to choose weak secrets such as short PINs, 
dictionary words, birthdays as passwords, which are 
vulnerable to dictionary attacks. Two early solutions to 
that problem are the Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) 
protocol [1] and Gong et al.’s protocol [4], which have 
several extensions [2, 7, 8, 10, 12] 
In this work we have designed a new strong user 
authentication protocol for GSM, in order to bring 
some flexibilities to GSM users. Mobile users can 
redirect their calls, reach their accounts without their 
SIM card, or easily disable their accounts without 
interacting with the operator of the service provider. 
We give an overview of strong password protocols 
in Section 2. Section 3 reviews the current GSM 
authentication protocol. Section 4 presents the new 
user authentication approach to GSM; Section 5 
presents the experimental results on the protocols; and 
finally Section 6 concludes the paper. 
The notations common to the rest of the paper are 
as follows: 
i : Password of user i 
Ex{p}: Public key encryption of plaintext p with the 
key of x 
K(p): Symmetric key encryption of plaintext p with 
key K. 
2. A Review of Strong Password Protocols 
Assume that two parties Alice and Bob try to 
establish a secret, authenticated session key for their 
communication. The only secret they share is a user 
password , which is vulnerable to dictionary attacks. 
The aim of strong password protocols is to authenticate 
the user while protecting the password against 
dictionary attacks by online eavesdroppers. Two early 
works in this category are the EKE protocol of 
Bellovin and Meritt [1] and the protocol of Gong et al. 
[4]. Both protocols aim to authenticate the parties of 
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communication and protect the user’s password against 
eavesdroppers. 
2.1 Encrypted Key Exchange 
The Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) protocol 
provides secure authentication between user and a 
server using a weak secret. There are two main classes 
of the EKE protocol; one based on public key 
encryption, the other on Diffie-Hellman key exchange. 
EKE is a generic protocol and can be used with any 
public key scheme with minor modifications [1]. Even 
though EKE is a secure user authentication protocol 
with weak secrets, generating per session public-
private key pairs and doing private key operations on 
client side make it infeasible to use with 
computationally restricted devices. 
In 2002 Zhu et al. presents a variant of RSA-EKE 
for mobile devices [13]. The proposed protocol 
eliminates the need for per session RSA key 
generation. However, an “interactive step” included 
against e-residue attacks brings additional 
computational costs on both the server and client sides. 
2.2 Protocol of Gong at al. 
Another influential work on strong user 
authentication with weak passwords is a proposal by 
Gong et al. [4]. This solution contains a trusted third 
party which is continuously available online, as in 
Kerberos. The parties in the system authenticate each 
other by the help of the trusted server. In this protocol, 
unlike EKE, there is no need to generate fresh 
public/private key pairs per session, but there is a need 
for the trusted server’s public key to be known to all 
parties. 
3. Review of Authentication in GSM 
GSM contains three entities in a session: a mobile 
subscriber (cellular phone), visiting location register 
(VLR), and home location register (HLR). Alice’s SIM 
card contains a secret authentication key KA and 
unique “International Mobile Subscriber Identity” 
(IMSI). A3, A5 and A8 algorithms are used in 
authentication, where A3 and A8 are one-way 
functions and A5 is a symmetric encryption function 
[6]. 
Fig. 1 illustrates the authentication protocol of GSM 
for the first connection attempt of the mobile 
subscriber to a certain VLR. KA and Kt respectively are 
permanent and temporary key of Alice (mobile client). 
Alice sends her unique identity to VLR, VLR passes 
this identity to HLR in order to inform it that Alice 
wants to log in to the system. HLR generates a random 
number RAND, calculates temporary authentication 
key Kt for consecutive attempts, and the security result 
SRES that is equal to KA and RAND encrypted with 
A3. VLR passes RAND to the mobile client and keeps 
Kt and SRES. Alice calculates SRES and sends it to 
VLR. If SRES sent by Alice is equal to SRES sent by 
HLR then VLR sends TMSI encrypted with Kc to the 
mobile client to be used in consecutive authentication 
attempts without the need of contacting the HLR. 
Figure 1. GSM Authentication using IMSI 
4. A User Authentication Protocol for GSM 
In this section, we describe the GSM User 
Authentication Protocol (GUAP). The current GSM 
authentication scheme uses a cryptographic 
authentication key embedded in the SIM card of the 
device. By the new approach, the user can authenticate 
with her password instead of the embedded key. Using 
passwords instead of embedded keys breaks the 
dependency on the SIM card during authentication. 
Users will be able to reach their accounts without their 
SIM cards, via any cellular phone, Internet, or a special 
network. Users can reach their address book, redirect 
their calls, or get their personal information without 
the need of either SIM card or giving their personal 
information to operators of the service provider. 
GSM authentication protocol resembles the approach 
of Gong et al. [4] in certain ways. Both schemes are 
based on three entities, and in both cases the third 
entity is a trusted server whose public key is known by 
all parties. Unlike Gong et al.’s protocol, in GSM 
authentication, VLR is an automated non-human 
entity, which is able to remember strong secrets. 
Another difference is in regard to the use of 
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timestamps. Clock synchronization may be a crucial 
problem in GSM authentication, which can be solved 
by generating random nonces for freshness guarantee 
of the sessions.  
GUAP is illustrated in Fig. 2. Mobile user wants to be 
authenticated to HLR via VLR, using her password .
A random nonce, RAND, is generated by VLR per 
session and provides freshness guarantee for the 
session. Three random nonces generated by the mobile 
client are n1, n2 and c; n1 proves the correct decryption 
of HLR in the fifth message, n2 masks the session key 
k, c protects the first message against replay by 
adversary. 
Figure 2. User authentication approach to 
GSM 
The protocol starts with the client’s authentication 
request by sending its unique identity (IMSI) to VLR. 
VLR generates and sends a random number RAND to 
Alice. Alice generates three random nonces n1, n2 and 
c, and encrypts RAND with her password. She then 
encrypts n1, n2, c, and (RAND) with HLR’s public 
key and sends it to VLR with a random challenge rA.
VLR takes the message and encrypts the RAND with 
its symmetric key, and sends it with HLR’s portion of 
the message to HLR. HLR, knowing VLR’s symmetric 
key, decrypts the message, then asymmetrically 
decrypt the message come from Alice, finally decrypts 
 (RAND) to get RAND, if both RAND are equal 
then HLR is sure about VLR’s and Alice’s identities. 
HLR generates a session key for VLR and Alice, 
encrypts it with VLR’s symmetric key for VLR, and 
encrypts the masked session key (n2  k) and n1 with 
Alice’s password, then sends both messages to VLR. 
VLR decrypts its portion of the message to get session 
key k, encrypts the challenge rA with k sent by Alice in 
first message, forwards Alice’s portion of message 
with the response to her challenge and a new challenge 
rB. Alice decrypts the message coming from HLR and 
gets the session key k. She then responds to VLR’s 
challenge. In consecutive sessions Alice and VLR can 
use the generated session key k without need of re-
authentication. 
The existence of the correct n1 value in the fifth 
message indicates that it is the HLR that has decrypted 
the first message and sending this output. The random 
nonce n2 protects HLR’s response encrypted by 
against dictionary attacks on  by an attacker who gets 
to know k or by VLR. The issue here is a dictionary 
attack by someone who knows k and hence can guess 
n1 and n2. Random c protects first message against 
regeneration by VLR: Again a malicious VLR or an 
adversary that has compromised a past session key k, 
can choose a candidate password  and decrypt the 
message of mobile client to get candidate n1  and n2 .
Without the confounder c, the adversary can generate a 
candidate first message. If the candidate message is 
equal to real message then the password guess is 
correct [4].   
In the protocol VLR is not a user entity, hence it is 
able to remember and perform its operations with a 
strong cryptographic key Kvlr. This reduces the 
computational cost of Gong et al.’s protocol. The only 
asymmetric key operation done by the mobile client is 
a public key encryption in the first message. If RSA is 
used here, then the public exponent of the key pair can 
be fixed to a small prime, reducing the computations 
on the client side. 
5. Experimental Results 
In order to test the efficiency of GUAP we carried 
out several simulation experiments. The HLR and 
VLR are simulated on a 2.4 GHz Pentium IV machine, 
and the mobile client runs on Sun’s KToolbar v.2.0 
simulation toolkit [14]. The simulations are 
implemented in Java2 Standard Edition (J2SE) for 
HLR and VLR, and in Java2 Mobile Edition (J2ME) 
for the mobile client. The cryptographic functions are 
inherited from the Bouncy Castle Lightweight Crypto 
API [15] for both J2SE and J2ME. 
Table 1. Average CPU time (in milliseconds) 
The simulation results show that the GUAP 
computations can be carried out efficiently in a 
reasonable time by all the parties, either with 512- or 
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1024-bit RSA. The load on the VLR is particularly 
low, as a result of the design decision to use symmetric 
key encryption between the VLR and HLR.  
Zhu et al.’s protocol seems to be significantly 
slower. However it must be noted that this protocol 
was designed for a somewhat more restricted setting 
where the mobile device does not have a priorly 
established trust with the server and cannot have the 
server’s public key installed securely beforehand. 
Nevertheless, we included it in the simulation 
experiments due to its significance as the only strong 
password protocol designed specifically for 
constrained mobile devices.  
6. Conclusion 
GSM is widely used over the world. If user 
authentication becomes possible for mobile users, 
everybody will be able to reach their accounts without 
their SIM card. People can redirect their calls through 
Internet, or reach their accounts through anybody’s 
phone only by entering their username and password. 
We have presented a strong user authentication 
protocol for GSM that permits user authentication to 
the standard. Our protocol is inspired by strong 
authentication protocols for weak secrets [1, 4]. Our 
main goal is to break the dependency on SIM cards for 
authentication in GSM and to make the standard more 
flexible for users. The design takes into consideration 
the computational restrictions of the mobile 
subscribers. It also enables authentication of VLR by 
both mobile subscriber and HLR. Besides; easy, fast, 
and trusted key disabling can be obtained by a minor 
extension to our protocol. 
As a final remark we would like to note that our 
protocol, although designed for GSM, is not a 
particularly specific to GSM and can easily be adopted 
to any other mobile protocol where a user device 
authenticates itself to its home server via a local base 
station. 
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